The defense establishment's proposal to expand the Israel Defense Forces operation in Lebanon was approved by a large majority of cabinet ministers on Wednesday: Nine ministers backed the proposal, while three abstained. But according to some attendees, the results of the vote do not reflect the ministers' true opinions. "If everyone voted the way they spoke, there would be a majority opposing the proposal," one minister said. So why didn't anyone vote against the proposal? We were afraid, the minister explained, of showing the public and the Hezbollah that there are rifts within the government and cracks in its support for the IDF.

The problem is that such cracks exist and no one is really making an effort to hide them anymore. Rifts between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz. Rifts between Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz. And those between the head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan and Head of the Imtelligence Corps, Amos Yadlin. And between Peretz and his predecessor, Shaul Mofaz and between Mofaz and Avi Dichter. One of those present summed the situation up by saying, "everyone was involved in at least one quarrel."

The prime minister does not like the master plan prepared for him this week by Peretz and Halutz. He feared that sending in several divisions to operate for a month, possibly two, in the hostile territory of southern Lebanon would entail multiple casualties, an ongoing occupation and would gnaw at the already dwindling remnants of Israel's international support. It is doubtful whether the Katyusha fire on northern Israeli towns would cease, even after such an operation. There will always be some Hezbollah man on donkey-back, poised and ready to launch a rocket into the Galilee, just like the Palestinian Qassam launchers are doing in Gaza.

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But Olmert's reservations clash with his original position, that the political echelon should not interfere with operational decisions, and that it should follow the army's recommendations. What should he do? Olmert found two ways to solve this dilemma - he allowed Mofaz to present before the ministers his plan for a swift, limited operation, a plan that would enable Israel to announce victory quickly and with a minimal casualties. Mofaz met with Olmert on Tuesday and presented his plan. According to one version of the story, he also told the chief of staff about it before the meeting.

The ministers reacted enthusiastically to the plan, and Peretz realized he had been ambushed. It was an obvious trick: The minister who has the most military experience in the government, Lieutenant General (res.) Shaul Mofaz, proposes an elegant and mischievous scheme, to counter the weighty, clumsy and danger-riddled plan proposed by his heir. If there are any complications, the public will know there was a simpler, cheaper solution.

Then Peretz burst reminding that Mofaz had been the one who neglected to deal with Hezbollah's massive arming during his tenure in the past few years. When the meeting was over, the accusations continued - on the one hand, voiced claimed that even if you have a new operational plan, you shouldn't wave it at a cabinet meeting just to demonstrate your superiority. Others counterclaimed that Mofaz had been opposed to Israel's unilateral pullout from Lebanon in the spring of 2000, and had also warned Israel of the dangers of the rocket arsenal there.
Olmert made efforts to restore calm in the meeting and explained that since he must maintain authority and responsibility, he can only bring the defense establishment's proposal up to a vote.

In the end, his salvation came from Condoleezza Rice. The U.S. Secretary of State called to inform the cabinet of expected progress in talks over a UN resolution which have so far been unfruitful. Livni had earlier conditioned her support for the proposal on a "timeout" to pursue a diplomatic resolution first before going ahead with the operation. As a result of Rice's news, Olmert and Livni managed to convince Peretz that the operation should be postponed for at least 48 hours.

And so the cabinet meeting ended in a rather predictable compromise: Approval of an outline of the operation in principle, while postponing its implementation to allow for development in the UN talks. Troops, however, will take up positions in preparation for the operation. Israel is telling the UN "hold me back," in efforts to prevent itself from getting swept up in any one decision and hoping for the best. Olmert's moment of truth has been postponed, at least until Friday.