It is too early to call officers to account for the needless loss of soldiers under their command.

While the conflict lasts, it's too soon to inquire into the actions of those responsible for the Hanit missile boat who didn't bother to switch on the electronic counter-measures while cruising off hostile shores.

It is also too soon to inquire how come soldiers who were killed on Sunday near Kfar Giladi huddled together in an open area, a few kilometers from the border, while the Home Front Command of the same army has been warning people for a month not to assemble or congregate throughout the north.

It is too soon to wonder about the senior officer in the battered brigade who "explained" yesterday that the soldiers who were killed wanted "to improve positions to be closer to their comrades fighting across the border." Such flawed discipline reflects the disorder, unpreparedness and incidents of mediocrity exposed in the IDF during the fighting.

On the other hand, it is not too late perhaps to demand of the army not to leave Israel, at the end of the war, defeated and exposed to any terror gang that might take up positions on any of its borders and aim missiles at its population.

Let there be no doubt: Despite the efforts of the prime minister and IDF generals to enumerate the IDF's achievements, the war as it approaches its end is seen by the region and the world - and even by the Israeli public - as a stinging defeat with possibly fateful implications. The criterion by which the result of the military conflict is measured, in Israel and abroad, is the number of missiles falling on the Israeli population, which has not slowed, but has even increased during the fighting. In the wake of such an outcome, Iran will doubtlessly attempt to supply missiles not only to a rehabilitated Hezbollah, but to any organization seeking to launch missiles at a weakened Israel.

However, part of the political and military establishment - like large parts of the public - believes there is still time and fortitude to sweep aside, even at this late stage, the 1982 Lebanon war. Today, unlike a month ago, there is no longer any trace of the illusion that the air force alone can eliminate the rocket launchers. Today everyone realizes that a resolute, broad ground operation is required for that.

But the IDF's ground operations in South Lebanon - which began belatedly, hesitantly and peicemeal - are still carried out without bringing to bear Israel's numerical advantage.

The defense that the government will mount in the post-conflict polemic is already being articulated. The IDF didn't recommend an extensive ground operation. The chief of staff did not propose mobilizing several divisions to go into battle to ensure victory. This excuse is not tenable.

Now, at this late and critical stage of the conflict, the IDF must propose, recommend and indeed must demand political approval - public approval is clearly assured - for extensive operations that can snatch a victory from the jaws of looming defeat